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On January 27, 1998, an embattled President Clinton stood before the
nation promoting a litany of government initiatives in his State of the Union
Address. Buried in his list of promises was a reference to a renewed
pursuit of foreign trade agreements. President Clinton attempted to allay
the fears of those who believe the expansion of free trade will only result in
lower environmental and labor standards for the United States. Rather, the
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President asserted that the United States cannot promote higher standards if
it retreats from foreign trade.'
The President directed this portion of his speech to fellow Democrats,
who played a large role in the defeat of Fast-Track in 1997.2 Many
Democrats feared how support of Fast-Track would impact their re-election
campaigns slated for 1998. Specifically, the AFL-CIO, a traditional
supporter of the Democratic Party, invested heavily in a public campaign to
defeat Fast-Track, claiming the expansion of free trade would only cost the
United States jobs.3
The Clinton Administration desired Fast-Track, in part, to assist in
building a hemispheric free trade zone to include all of the Americas by the
year 2005." The President promoted this agenda in a 1997 trip to South
America.5 The use of Fast-Track to create a free trade zone of the
Americas, however, confronts some tensions within the United States'
federal structure.
The Constitution creates a federal system based upon the coexistence
of the central government and the state governments.6  The state
governments retain certain powers. However, the trend of trade
liberalization and the power of states have come into conflict. Trade
liberalization includes the reduction of "non-tariff barriers." These non-
tariff barriers are regulations that have the effect of limiting access to a
particular market of imported goods. However, regulations may stem from
legitimate concerns of a state for its population. Yet, as the states do
participate in trade agreement negotiations, they may find themselves
bound by an instrument calling for changes in their regulatory scheme
without participation. By giving the President the authority to act as the
I. President's State of the Union Address, reprinted in This Is Not a Time to Rest. It Is
a Time to Build, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1998, at A24.
2. Fast-Track involves a grant of authority to the President in international trade
matters. Under Fast-Track procedures, the President would have the authority to enter into trade
negotiations, conclude a trade agreement, and submit the implementing legislation to Congress.
Congress would then be prohibited from amending the implementing legislation, and could only
approve or disapprove the measure. Fast-Track aims to streamline the process of concluding trade
agreements, resulting in greater efficiency and certainty for trading partners of the United States.
3. Terry M. Neal, Ad Watch: Trade Policy, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1997, at A22.
4. Carla Anne Robbins & Matt Moffett, Clinton Hopes to Boost Pact on Latin Trip,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1997, at A15.
5. Anthony Faiola, Brazilians Wary of U.S. Trade Pact: Businesses Fear Dropped
Barriers Could Damage Recovering Economy, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1997, at A24.
6. When dealing with an issue such as international trade that affects both foreign
nations and the fifty states of the United States, there exists a danger of confusion with respect to
terms. The word "state" has a different meaning within the context of international law, and
United States domestic law. To avoid this confusion, where possible, the term "state" in this
paper refers to one of the fifty political subdivisions within the United States. For the sake of
simplicity, the term "nation" will be used to denote a state in the context of international law.
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voice of the nation in trade agreements involving non-tariff barriers, Fast-
Track has the effect of eroding federalism.
This paper examines how Fast-Track affects the United States
constitutional system. Part I explains the background to Fast-Track and
NAFTA. Part II outlines the power of Congress to regulate Foreign
Commerce with respect to state sovereignty. Part III argues that states
have a legitimate concern under the Constitution in regulating for the
benefit of their citizens. As Fast-Track does not involve formal
consultation with the states prior to the conclusion of the trade agreements,
it does threaten to erode the principle of federalism. Part III suggests an
alternative to preserve federalism by including consultations with state
governors during the negotiation process.
I. FAST-TRACK, FREE TRADE, AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
A. Background
Congress delegated power to the President to conclude international
trade agreements as a method of avoiding the influence of special interests.
Congress became aware of this danger after protectionist interests in 1934
pursued policies helping to push the world into the Great Depression.'
Congress responded through the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1934' which delegated in the President the authority to negotiate and
implement international trade agreements.9 Congress periodically extended
this authority until 1967 when it lapsed.' °
President Ford and Congress negotiated a renewal of presidential
authority over international trade through the Fast-Track provisions of the
Trade Act of 1974 (hereinafter "1974 Act").' Under Fast-Track, the
President must first make a determination that barriers to trade "unduly
burden and restrict the foreign trade of the United States or adversely affect
the United States economy." 2 Then, the President may enter into a trade
agreement to remove those barriers.13 The President must notify Congress
of his intentions ninety days before entering into a trade agreement. " The
President then submits the implementing bill through the majority leaders in
7. Michael A. Carrier, All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to
Beyond, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 687, 697 (1996).
8. Pub. L. No. 73-316, 48 Stat. 943 (1934) (codified as 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1354).
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1)(A)(1934).
10. Edmund W. Sims, Derailing the Fast-Track for International Trade Agreements, 5
FLA. J. INT'L L. 471, 475 (1990).
11. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191 (1974)).
12. 19 U.S.C. § 2112(b)(1).
13. Id.
14. Id. at § 2112(e)(1).
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both the House of Representatives and the Senate.' 5 Congress may not
amend the implementing bill.' 6 Congressional committees then have forty-
five days to consider the bill. If the bill is still in committee after forty-five
days, it is automatically discharged. 7 A vote on the final passage of the
bill is to be held no later than fifteen days after its discharge.'" This gives
Congress a total of sixty days to consider the bill. Debate in both the
House' 9 and the Senate2° is limited to twenty hours. Fast-Track under the
1974 Act lapsed in 1980. Congress renewed Fast-Track authority with the
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,21 and the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988. 2 Fast-Track authority lapsed in 1993.
B. Changes in Trade Agreements: NAFTA and the WTO
The end of the Cold War led to dramatic changes in the world
economy. The economies of the world have become more
interdependent. 23 There has been a general rise in the understanding that
international issues affect domestic interests. 24 The process of globalization
has caused "a worldwide convergence of economic and political values."'
As the North American Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter "NAFTA") 26
and the World Trade Organization (hereinafter "WTO") 27 demonstrate, the
nations of the world have agreed that the lifting of barriers is the best way
to promote international trade. However, these new trade agreements have
provoked a debate on the limitations of Fast-Track in considering the
domestic impact of international trade issues.
1. Fast-Track and Adequate Debate
Through agreements such as NAFTA and the WTO, the scope of
international trade agreements have expanded to include issues previously
15. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(c)(1).
16. Id. at § 2191(d).
17. Id. at § 2191(e)(1).
18. Id.
19. Id. at § 2191(0(2).
20. 19 U.S.C. § 2192(g)(2).
21. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984).
22. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2903 (1988)).
23. Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
429, 430, 439 (1997).
24. Id. at 429, 433.
25. Id. at 429.
26. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993) [hereinafter "NAFTA"].
27. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 13
(1994).
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considered to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national
government. These new trade agreements give international entities a
greater ability to review domestic laws to determine if they create non-tariff
barriers that are incompatible with the principles of the agreements. This
creates the potential for the alteration of a nation's domestic laws and a
limitation on that nation's sovereignty. As Fast-Track limits debate, there
is a question as to whether there is an adequate opportunity to assess fully
the impact of these agreements on domestic law.'
Fast-Track may not adequately protect the interests of states with
respect to the harmonization of domestic laws. In December of 1992, the
United States, Canada, and Mexico concluded NAFTA. NAFTA differed
from previous trade agreements involving the United States as it provided
for greater economic integration between the United States, Canada and
Mexico. 29 Through NAFTA, "the United States [surrendered] its role, at
least to Canada and Mexico, as a separate trading entity and [became] a
part of a regional entity." 3"
By developing a system that strives for greater harmonization,
NAFTA created a tension between trade liberalization and the sovereignty
of subsidiary governments. Article 105 of NAFTA states: "The Parties
shall ensure that all necessary measures are taken to give effect to the
provisions of this Agreement, including their observance, except as
otherwise provided in this Agreement, by state and provincial
governments."3 Thus, the drafters of NAFTA consciously bound their
governments to strive for integration even of their subsidiary governments.
For the United States, this aspect of NAFTA led to objections from
state governments. The "impetus for globalization" has limited the states'
ability to regulate in areas such as environmental protection, labor
28. See Dana Rohrabacher, Pennies for Thoughts: How GATT Fast Track Harms
American Patent Applicants, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 491, 494 (1996).
Representative Rohrabacher raised the concern of adequate debate when she testified before the
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property on the effect the WTO had on United States
patent law. Before the creation of the WTO, United States patent law guaranteed seventeen years
of protection to the patent owner after the date the patent was issued. Id. Under the WTO,
however, Representative Rohrabacher claimed patent protection was changed to twenty years from
the date of application. Id. at 495. Because protection under United States law would now start
at the time of application, inventors applying for patents representing significant technological
breakthroughs would receive less protection under these changes as such patents typically take a
number of years to issue. Id. at 495-96. Representative Rohrabacher claimed that as this passed
under Fast-Track procedures, Congress did not give the change "neither full debate nor full
scrutiny." Id. at 494. As Fast-Track prohibited Congress from adequately addressing this issue
due to the limitation of debate, this significant change in the law was not addressed thoroughly.
29. C. O'Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy and Free Trade Agreements: Why the
NAFTA Turned into a Battle, 28 GEo.WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 6 (1994).
30. Id. at 7. (alteration in original).
31. NAFTA, supra note 26, art. 105 (emphasis added).
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protection, health and safety standards, and competition rules.32 No
constitutional duty exists for federal authorities to consult with the states
when negotiating trade agreements.33 Yet, by the terms of NAFTA, states
must regulate according to its guidelines.34 In response to this situation,
state authorities complained that NAFTA weakened the enforcement of
state regulations.35 State laws would now become subject to challenge as
non-conforming to NAFTA provisions on non-tariff barriers. 36  NAFTA
brought into conflict the goal of integrating the North American economies
in order to facilitate trade and the sovereignty of state governments.
2. NAFTA Labor and Environmental Issues
NAFTA's failure to address labor and environmental issues in the text
of the primary agreement set the stage for a bitter political battle in the
United States.37 By including Mexico in the agreement, the opponents of
NAFTA feared the agreement would lead to the erosion of labor and
environmental standards in the United States. Mexican labor is cheaper
than that of the United States and Canada. This gives Mexico a
comparative advantage in labor costs.3" Thus, by adding Mexico to the
free trade agreement, opponents argued jobs would migrate from the
United States to Mexico. Opponents also argued NAFTA would also
create pressure on the United States to lower its labor standards.3 9
With respect to environmental protection, Mexico is a developing
nation. Mexican environmental regulations are less stringent than those of
the United States and Canada. The Mexican government is also less
effective in enforcing those regulations. As companies can take advantage
of this situation, this gives Mexico a comparative advantage with respect to
environmental standards. Companies wishing to decrease their costs in
connection to protecting the environment could move to Mexico.'
Further, opponents to NAFTA were concerned that United States
environmental standards could come under attack as non-tariff barriers.4'
32. A.J. Tangeman, Comment, NAFTA and the Changing Role of State Government in a
Global Economy: Will the NAFTA Federal-State Consultation Process Preserve State
Sovereignty?, 20 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 243, 244 (1996).
33. Id. at 245-46.
34. Id. at251.
35. Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: The
Side Effects of Free Trade, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 401, 425 (1995).
36. Id.
37. Taylor, supra note 29, at 8.
38. Id. at 82-83.
39. Id. at 80.
40. Id. at 99-100.
41. Id. at 101.
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NAFTA was seen by opponents as setting a dangerous precedent for
future trade agreements. By ceding authority over non-tariff barriers to
other trading partners, the United States endangered the concerns of labor
and environmental interests. To this end, President Clinton proposed
addressing labor and environmental issues in side agreements to NAFTA.42
This, however, did not alleviate the concerns of NAFTA opponents. The
result was a fierce political battle over the passage of the implementation
legislation.
C. The 1997 Proposals
President Clinton submitted to Congress a proposal to renew the
President's authority to negotiate trade agreements utilizing Fast-Track.43
This proposal was known as the Export Expansion and Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act of 1997 (hereinafter "1997 Clinton Proposal"). 44 The
proposal came at a time when the President desired to begin negotiations to
include Chile in NAFTA. 45
In response to the President's request for Fast-Track authority,
Representative Bill Archer, Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, introduced H.R. 2621, a bill entitled the "Reciprocal Trade
Agreement Authorities Act" (hereinafter "H.R. 2621"). 46 H.R. 2621 left
intact the procedure for Fast-Track as set forth in the 1974 Act.47 H.R.
2621 also provided for consultations between the Executive and
41Congress.
H.R. 2621 also sought to ensure that foreign nations would not use
labor, environmental, health and safety standards are as arbitrary or
unjustified barriers to trade. 49 H.R. 2621 further aimed to prevent a nation
from taking advantage of lowering their labor and environmental standards.
To accomplish this task, H.R. 2621 charged the President with ensuring
that a nation does not waive or derogate from its existing standards in order
to gain a competitive advantage in trade.
50
42. Taylor, supra note 29, at 8.
43. Letter from President William J. Clinton to the Congress of the United States (Sept.
16, 1997).
44. Export Expansion and Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1997 (visited Sept. 18,
1997) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/lnitiatives/FastTrack/bilI.html>.
45. Bob Davis & Greg Hitt, Clinton Asks for Trade-Pact Authority, Avoiding Labor,
Environmental Issues, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1997, at A2.
46. H.R. 2621, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) [hereinafter H.R. 2621].
47. Id. § 103(b)(3).
48. Id. § 104.
49. Id. § 102(b)(7)(A).
50. Id. § 102(b)(7)(B).
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II. FAST-TRACK AS A THREAT TO FEDERALISM
A. The Role of Federalism in the United States Constitutional System
The Founding Fathers built the United States' government upon the
principle of federalism. Instead of creating single central government and
dissolving the existing state governments, the Federal Government was
superimposed upon the several states. James Madison specifically rejected
the notion that the Constitution would spell the downfall of the state
governments. Rather, Madison envisioned the states as "essential parts of
the federal government," playing a larger role in the lives of the people
than the Federal Government.51 To that end, Madison argued, "[T]he
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government
are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments
are numerous and indefinite." 52
Federalism continues to serve a vital function in the United States. By
retaining the states, the federal system promotes diversity, pluralism, and
experimentation in public policy.53 In addition, federalism serves a
prophylactic function. The continued existence and vitality of the states
protects the people "from arbitrary majoritarianism and overcentralization
.... ",5 The structure of the Constitution sought to avoid the accumulation
of power in a single entity.55 By dispersing power, not only among the
three branches of the Federal Government, but also among the Federal
Government and the governments of the states, the Constitution serves to
secure the people from such an excessive accumulation.
Federalism ensures a "greater degree of citizen participation."56
Through a republican form of government, the people choose
representatives to serve their interests. When a single legislature governs a
population the size of the United States, the voice of a single citizen is
necessarily diluted. But when a republican government governs smaller
geographical units with smaller populations, the citizens have a greater
voice in the formation of public policy. In a state legislature, the ratio of
citizens to representatives is smaller than in the Congress which governs
the entire nation. The smaller the ratio, the greater influence a single voter
has. Federalism, therefore, ensures greater liberty, and gives the voter
greater control over their own governance. Federalism is a value that
should be secured, and protected.
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison).
52. Id.
53. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN AMERICA
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 105 (1969).
54. Id.
55. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
56. ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 53, at 105.
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B. Congressional Power over Commerce and State Sovereignty
Congress has the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
nations." s Chief Justice John Marshall stated "[The power of Congress
does not stop at the judicial lines of the several States. It would be a very
useless power, if it could not pass those lines."58 The Tenth Amendment,
however, declares that all "powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people. 59 The question is whether this reservation
of power to the states can act as a limit on the power of Congress to
regulate foreign commerce.
1. The Commerce Clause and State Sovereignty
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the relationship between the
Commerce Clause and state sovereignty in National League of Cities v.
Usery.' Congress exercised its commerce power by amending the Fair
Labor Standards Act [hereinafter "FLSA"] 61 to extend its coverage to state
employees.' The Court proclaimed: "This Court has never doubted that
there are limits upon the power of Congress to override sovereignty, even
when exercising its otherwise plenary power to tax or to regulate
commerce which are conferred by Article I of the Constitution."63
Congress used its Commerce power to regulate "States in their capacities
as sovereign governments," interfering with states acting "in areas of
traditional governmental functions."' The act was, thus, unconstitutional.
The Court revisited Usery in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transportation Authority.' The Court faced the issue of whether state
sovereignty immunized states from the minimum wage and overtime
provisions of the FLSA.' The Court asserted that lower federal courts
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
58. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 195 (1824). Gibbons, however, involved
the conflict between a New York act that granted a monopoly over the navigation of waterways
within its jurisdiction with a license granted by Congress. Id. at 2-3. As the case involved
interstate commerce, Marshall's discussion of international commerce is dicta. However,
Marshall was using the discussion to explain the extent of Congressional power over commerce,
and to illustrate how that power penetrates state boundaries.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. X (ratified 1791).
60. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)(1994).
62. Usery, 426 U.S. at 836-37.
63. Id. at 842.
64. Id. at 851-52. Chief Justice Rehnquist listed a few traditional governmental functions.
They are: fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public safety, and parks and recreation.
65. 469 U.S. 528 (1984).
66. Id. at 533.
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struggled with the Usery standard of "identifying a traditional function for
the purpose of state immunity under the Commerce Clause." 67 The Court
rejected the Usery standard as "unworkable" and "inconsistent with
established principles of federalism . . . ."' Accordingly, the Court
upheld the constitutional validity of the FLSA as it applied to the states. 69
In support of his opinion, Justice Blackmun contended that the rights
of states received protection from the structure of the federal government. 70
The Constitution accommodated state sovereignty through representation in
the House of Representatives, and equal representation in the Senate.7'
This protected the states from an overreaching Congress. 72
Justice O'Connor dissented stating, "The Court today surveys the
battle scene of federalism and sounds a retreat. Like Justice Powell, I
would prefer to hold the field and, at the very least, render a little aid to
the wounded."'7 O'Connor proclaimed, "The true 'essence' of federalism
is that the States as States have legitimate interests which the National
Government is bound to respect even though it laws are supreme." 74 In
O'Connor's view, the courts must remain diligent in protecting the
principle of federalism. 75 Reminding the Court of Chief Justice Marshall's
formula from McCulloch v. Maryland,76 Justice O'Connor declared, "It is
not enough that the 'end be legitimate'; the means to that end must not
contravene the spirit of the Constitution."'77 Therefore, just because the
task may be difficult, courts should not abdicate its duty to protect state
sovereignty.78
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor defended state sovereignty
in Gregory v. Ashcroft. ' In that case, state judges challenged a provision
of the Missouri Constitution requiring judges to retire at age seventy as a
violation of the ADEA. 8  Justice O'Connor asserted that "a healthy
balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will
67. Id. at 530.
68. Id. at 531.
69. Id. at 546.
70. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transp. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1984).
71. Id. at 551.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 580 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 581 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
75. Garcia at 581 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
76. 17 U.S. (3 Wheat) 316 (1819).
77. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 585 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 588-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
79. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
80. Id. at 456.
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reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front. "81 The states,
therefore, "retain substantial powers under our constitutional scheme,
powers with which Congress does not readily interfere."82 The citizens of
a sovereign state have a right to set the qualifications for judges within
their state.83 Thus, as ambiguity existed as to whether judges were
employees under the act, O'Connor construed the act to avoid the intrusion
upon the rights of the states, thereby upholding the Missouri constitutional
age requirement.8
. The limits of the use of commerce power by Congress to proscribe
rules to the states when involved in environmental matters became an issue
in New York v. United States.85 A provision of an act of Congress required
the states to regulate radioactive waste in a manner consistent with the
direction of Congress, or to "take title to and possession of low level
radioactive waste generated within their borders and become liable for all
damages waste generators suffer as a result of the States' failure to do so
promptly. "86 The Court concluded: "that while Congress has substantial
power under the Constitution to encourage the States to provide for the
disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders, the
Constitution does not confer on Congress the ability to compel the States to
do so.,, 87
Therefore, Congress cannot use its commerce power to direct the
states to adopt a particular scheme of regulation.88 The choice given to the
states, to regulate according to the Congressional desire or take title to the
waste, was "tantamount to coercion," and therefore an unconstitutional
invasion of state sovereignty.89
Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to regulate the
state's relationship to its employees as if it were a private employer.
However, Congress may not intrude upon the states' sovereign
prerogatives. Congress may not use its commerce power to interfere with
the means by which a state chooses it public officials. Nor may Congress
use its commerce power to direct the states to adopt regulations that
Congress prescribed.
81. Id. at 458.
82. d. at 461.
83. Id. at 473.
84. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991).
85. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
86. Id. at 174-75.
87. Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 161.
89. Id. at 175.
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2. Foreign Affairs and State Sovereignty
The cases mentioned above, however, dealt with Congressional power
over interstate commerce. As Fast-Track would extend to the President the
ability to negotiate international trade agreements, the power of Congress
to regulate when faced with state sovereignty may take on a new
dimension.
Justice Holmes found the power of the Federal Government over
international affairs to confront different considerations when conflicting
with state action in Missouri v. Holland.93 Holland involved a treaty
between the United States and Great Britain concerning the killing of
migratory birds that passed between Canada and the United States. 9'
Justice Holmes first noted while "[a]cts of Congress are the supreme law of
the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution"' no such
qualification existed with respect to the supremacy of treaties. Holmes
found it questionable whether the provisions of the treaty were contrary to
the Constitution. 93 "The only question is whether [the treaty] is forbidden
by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth
Amendment." 94 Holmes concluded that "[n]o doubt the great body of
private relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty
may override its power."' Therefore, when the nation faced an issue that
could only be addressed in conjunction with a foreign nation, the Federal
Government ma intrude upon the states' power and proscribe a rule
through a treaty.
State action may nonetheless be upheld even when that action may
have an effect on international relations. In Clark v. Allen9' a resident of
the State of California died in 1942 bequeathing her property to relatives in
Germany.9" The California Probate Code at that time required a foreign
nation grant reciprocal rights to United States citizens before aliens residing
in that nation could take property by succession or through a will.' The
Court conceded that this statute had some incidental effect in foreign
nations. 00 However, when there is no overriding federal interest, and the
state did not actively pursue foreign policy, a statute having incidental
90. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
91. Id. at 431.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 433-34.
94. Id.
95. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920).
96. Id. at 435.
97. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
98. Id. at 505.
99. Id. at506, n.1.
100. Id. at 517.
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effects on foreign relations is not automatically invalid.' 1 Therefore, the
California statute was valid.
Different consequences follow when a state actively pursues a foreign
policy agenda. In Zschering v. Miller 2 a resident of Oregon died intestate
leaving heirs in the Communist nation of East Germany. An Oregon
statute required a foreign nation to guarantee the right of its citizens to
receive property by succession "without confiscation" before the property
could be transferred. 0 3 The Court determined that the statute was an
intrusion in the field of foreign affairs, entrusted by the Constitution to the
President and Congress. °4 The Court noted that the statute aimed to
exclude Marxist nations from taking title to the property of the deceased."5
In order to determine when "confiscation" occurs, the State of Oregon
would have to make inquiries into foreign law, and judge the credibility of
diplomatic statements." The Court noted that decisions under this law
were made according to foreign policy attitudes present during the Cold
War.1°7 The Court stated that the lack of a treaty on the subject matter was
itself not dispositive. Rather, "even in the absence of a treaty, a State's
policy may disturb foreign relations. " " As such, the Oregon statute was
found unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the extent of the foreign
commerce power of Congress in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles.1 " In this case, Japanese shipping companies owned ships
designed to carry cargo containers. These containers would travel through
the State of California. Under California law, property located in the state
on March 1 of any year was subject to an ad valorem tax." The Japanese
company paid the tax, but sued for a refund."'
The issue before the Court was whether the California tax
unconstitutionally intruded upon the power of Congress to regulate foreign
commerce. The Court noted that "[w]hen construing Congress' power to
'regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,' a more extensive constitutional
inquiry is required" than under the interstate commerce power. 1'
101. Id. at 517. One such overriding federal interest could be if a treaty is in force on the
subject.
102. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
103. Id. at 431.
104. Id. at 432.
105. Id. at 434.
106. Id.
107. Zschering v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 437 (1968).
108. Id. at 441.
109. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
110. Id. at 437.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 446.
1998]
84 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 5:71
Specifically, in foreign commerce, there is a greater need for national
uniformity: "[A] state tax on the instrumentalities of foreign commerce
may impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is
essential. Foreign commerce is pre-eminently a matter of national
concern." 1 3  The California tax created an asymmetry in international
taxation that created a disadvantage for Japan. "4 Therefore, as the tax
defeated uniformity, it stood as an unconstitutional invasion of the foreign
commerce power of Congress. 115
That a tax scheme may differ from state to state, however, is not
enough to invalidate the tax as an invasion of the foreign commerce power.
In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board"6 a California
franchise tax employed the "unitary business" principle in determining the
tax base. "7 California applied this principle to a Delaware corporation
doing business in California as well as in foreign nations. The Court
asserted that merely because a tax has "resonations" in foreign affairs, it is
not necessarily unconstitutional. 118  Here, the tax did not create an
asymmetry in international taxation." 9  Taken with the fact that it was
imposed on a United States corporation, the Court held that the foreign
policy of the United States was not seriously threatened by the tax. 120
The Holland holding dealt specifically with the power of treaties to
displace state regulation. Under the authority granted by Fast-Track, the
President would not negotiate a treaty for the purposes of Article VI of the
Constitution, but an executive agreement authorized by a delegation of
power by Congress. Congress would need to pass implementing legislation
for the agreement to have the force of law. In that regard, it would not
deserve the enshrinement as the supreme law of the land as a treaty.
Both the Clark and Container Corp. of America decisions show that
more is necessary for a state law to be unconstitutional than the fact that the
law touches upon foreign relations incidentally. Under these precedents, a
state law will be found unconstitutional when a state intends to affect
foreign policy, even when that law falls within the traditional state
jurisdiction. Thus, despite the fact that probate law is an area of regulation
113. Id. at 448.
114. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,453 (1979).
115. Id. at 453-54.
116. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
117. Id. at 162-63. Under the unitary business formula, the state first defines the scope of
the business entity's activities in the taxing jurisdiction. Then, the state apportions income
between the taxing jurisdiction and the elsewhere by looking at the character of the activities
performed within and without the jurisdiction. Id. at 165.
118. Id. at 193 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S.
425, 448 (1980)).
119. Id. at 195.
120. id. at 196.
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reserved to the states, when the Oregon law in Zschering required state
judges to make foreign policy considerations it intruded upon the foreign
policy powers of the Federal Government. The aim of the Oregon statute
was to further Cold War objectives by denying the validity of testamentary
gifts made to citizens of Communist nations. In contrast stands the
decision in Clark. The California statute applied equally to all foreign
nations. The only requirement was that of reciprocity. The California
statute did not attempt to pursue an international affairs agenda of favoring
nations adhering to an ideology consistent with that of the United States.
A state regulation that has the effect of barring the importation of
foreign goods should not be found invalid unless it reflects an attempt on
the part of a state to interfere in foreign policy matters. Often, when a
state regulates in the areas of health, safety, environmental and labor
standards, it is acting to protect the interests of its citizens. So long as the
regulations are not applied in a discriminatory fashion there is little danger
that the aim of the state is to affect foreign policy. When the regulation
does not aim to affect foreign policy it does not represent an
unconstitutional encroachment upon the power of the Federal Government.
The decision of the Court in Japan Line appears to be consistent with
the need for establishing a uniform system of taxation with respect to
foreign commerce. Thus, the Foreign Commerce Clause would forbid a
state from imposing its own tariffs. Extending the reach of the foreign
commerce power of Congress to all non-tariff barriers, however, would
appear contrary to the design of the Founding Fathers. The historical
experience of the American Colonies supports the notion that in delegating
the power to regulate foreign commerce to Congress, the Founding Fathers
were concerned primarily with taxation as a means of regulation."'2 Thus,
in the experience of the Founding Fathers, the imposition of duties acted as
the main vehicle of regulation of international trade.
The concept of non-tariff barriers only recently emerged in
multilateral trade agreements. The Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations,
which lasted from 1973 to 1979, was the first time multilateral trade
121. Prior to independence, Great Britain imposed upon the American Colonies the system
of mercantilism. Britain imposed high duties on imports in order to force the American Colonies
to purchase goods from other British possessions, and not from competing foreign colonies in the
West Indies. ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
12 (1935).
Alexander Hamilton asserted that a unity of national regulation over international
trade was necessary in order to give the United States an advantage over foreign powers. THE
FEDERALIST, No. 11 (Hamilton). By uniting against foreign nations such as Great Britain,
Hamilton theorized that the United States could force Britain to open markets in the West Indies,
and protect American rights concerning fisheries, and navigation of the Great Lakes and
Mississippi River. Id. Therefore, the grant of power over foreign commerce was meant to
provide the United States with a united front when acting in international trade issues.
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negotiations focused on the issue of non-tariff barriers.'22 Previously, the
primary concern of trade negotiations was the level of tariffs. It appears
unlikely that the Founding Fathers conceived of the regulation of non-tariff
barriers when drafting the Constitution.
III. INJECTING THE STATES INTO FAST-TRACK
A. States Have a Legitimate Role to Play in International Trade
The United States embarked on a new era of international trade
relations demanding greater federal and state cooperation. Since the end of
the Cold War, the world has become increasingly economically
interdependent. 123 Issues of foreign relations have direct effects on the
lives of United States citizens. 24 For example, lower wage levels in
nations such as Mexico create incentives for companies to locate
manufacturing facilities in those nations. As a result, manufacturing jobs
have been migrating out of the United States.
Greater participation of the state governments in international trade
does not represent an intrusion upon the power of the Federal Government.
Rather, it is an adaptation "to a changing world in which the line between
national and state or local concerns is much less clear than when the
Republic was founded."" 2 By acting in international trade, states merely
"promote legitimate concerns and interests and express the views of their
citizens in international and foreign policy issues of relevance and
importance to them."' 26 Foreign trade and investment translates into more
local jobs. The role of the state in some respects has become to act as the
protector and creator of jobs within their boundaries. Much of the state
action in international trade has been to further these roles.127
Additional concerns have been raised by the creation of a free trade
zone through NAFTA. Free trade zones aim to eliminate barriers to trade
among its members. This means not only the elimination of customs and
duties, but also the elimination of non-tariff barriers. Non-tariff barriers
122. D.M. McRae & J.C. Thomas, The GATT and Multilateral Treaty-Making: The Tokyo
Round, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 51, 68 (1983).
123. Seita, supra note 23, at 439.
124. Id. at 433.
125. Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 821, 828 (1989).
126. Id.
127. For example, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the City of Philadelphia
recently pursued the Norwegian shipbuilding firm of Kvaener SA to invest in the Philadelphia
Navy Yard. The Navy Yard was closed by the United States Government in 1995. Since then,
the Commonwealth and City governments have actively sought an investor to utilize the shipyard
in order to create more jobs in the Philadelphia area. J. Alex Tarquino, Developments:
Philadelphia's Ship May Be Coming In, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 1997, at 110.
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include more than just the imposition of quotas on imports. The term is ill
defined, and subject to an expansive meaning.'2 In 1974, when Congress
approved Fast-Track, the Senate stated that the term: "cover[s] a variety
of devices which distort trade, including quotas, variable levies, border
taxes, discriminatory procurement and internal taxation practices, rules of
origin requirements, subsidies and other direct and indirect means used to
discourage imports or artificially stimulate or restrict exports."129 The
Senate definition demonstrates the ambiguity, and expansive nature of the
term. Specifically, an indirect measure used to discourage imports may
refer to any regulation that has the effect of restricting trade. Such an
expansive definition of "non-tariff barriers" has been used by the European
Union. 30 Regulations in matters such as health, safety, and labor issues
can be viewed as non-tariff barriers if they have the effect of acting as an
impediment to market entry of products from other nations. TM  If
congressional power over foreign commerce is read to pre-empt state
regulation over all non-tariff barriers, there is a real danger of encroaching
upon the state sovereignty.
128. Non-tariff barriers have been defined as obstructions to international trade other than
customs duties or taxes on importation. 2 R. STURM, CUSTOMS LAWS & ADMINISTRATION §
61.2 (1985).
129. S. REP. No. 1298, at 74 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7224
(reporting on a bill granting President authority to enter into trade agreements regarding non-tariff
barriers).
130. Any national rule directly or indirectly, actually or potentially capable of hindering
trade is forbidden by the EU as a non-tariff barrier. Case 120/78, Reme-Zentral AG v.
Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, [1978] E.C.R. 649.
131. NAFTA does allow the member nations to retain the right to promulgate standards
related to safety, protection of life and health, protection of the environment, and the protection of
consumers. These regulations must conform to the principle of non-discrimination. In addition,
unnecessary obstacles to trade cannot be established. The regulations must have a demonstrated
purpose of achieving a legitimate object, and the regulation cannot exclude goods of a member
nation that meets that legitimate object. NAFTA, supra note 26, art. 904.
A similar provision is found in the European Union. Nations that are part of the EU
may maintain their own standards. However, any national rule that is directly or indirectly,
actually or potentially capable of hindering trade is forbidden as a non-tariff barrier. If the EU
has not itself developed a rule on a certain issue, the member nations may adopt their rules that
are reasonable and proportional. A proportional measure cannot be broader than necessary. Case
120/78, Reme-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, [1978] E.C.R. 649.
Indeed, Germany's beer purity laws came under attack for violating the rule of
proportionality. While Germany defended its law as a measure necessary to protect the health of
German citizens, the European Court of Justice found that the regulation was not necessary to
protect public health. Of key importance was the fact that other European nations allowed the
very additives and preservatives forbidden by German law. In addition, Germany allowed the
same preservatives when used in other beverages. Case 178/84, Re Purity Requirements for
Beer: Commission v. Germany, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
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In order to create greater integration of markets, harmonization is
necessary not only among the national governments, but the
subgovernments as well. Within a national government that employs a
federal scheme, power is diffused among the national and subgovenments.
In the United States, the fifty states and the District of Columbia may
regulate certain subject matters. Specifically, under the police power, the
states have the power to regulate the health, safety, welfare, and morals of
its citizens.132  Such standards may preclude the admission of imported
products to the state's market when those products fail to meet those
standards. The negotiators of NAFTA specifically aimed to address this
problem, by binding the national governments to ensure that their
subgovernments adhere to the agreement. 133 If states must adhere to the
requirements of a trade agreement such as NAFTA, regulations may need
to come into conformity with the agreement. By aiming to reduce non-
tariff barriers, these agreements may encroach upon state sovereignty.
State governments do not play a formal role in trade negotiations. As a
result, states may be bound to change their laws and regulations by an
agreement which they had no part in creating. By precluding states from
participating in the negotiation of international trade agreements, issues
which increasingly have local consequences are being made by a more
remote decision-making bodies.'34 Involving states in international trade
only serves to further the democratic process.
It has been argued that the structure of the federal government protects
the rights of states. 3  However, constitutional changes have eliminated any
body of the Federal Government that represents the interests of states as
states. Each state is entitled to two Senators. 36  However, due to the
Seventeenth Amendment Senators are popularly elected, not appointed by
the state governments.'37 While Senators do represent the population of the
state from which they are elected, they do not necessarily represent the
interests of the state governments.
Under Fast-Track, no provision exists to protect the legitimate
interests of the states to promulgate regulations. Yet, should the United
States follow the precedent set in NAFTA, states will be bound by trade
agreements to comply with their terms. This effectively robs the states of
132. Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 577 (1847); Commonwealth v.
Alger, 61 Mass. 53 (1851).
133. NAFTA, supra note 26, art. 105.
134. "As national governments become larger, more remote and more indifferent, it is
only through state and local governments, more accessible and responsive to their views, that
ordinary citizens can make their voices heard." Bilder, supra note 125, at 828-29.
135. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transp. Auth., 469 U.S. 550 (1984).
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, ci. 1.
137. Originally, under Article I, § 3 of the Constitution, the state legislatures chose the
Senators. The rules changed in 1913 with the passage of the 17th Amendment.
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their sovereignty in favor of the central government. Through the
mechanism of trade agreements, the President and Congress may direct the
states to adopt a course of regulation of subjects rightfully within the states'
police power. Trade agreements, therefore, would allow the federal
government to violate the standard of New York v. United States. 3'
B. A Proposal
A solution to this problem would be to create a role for the states in
Fast-Track. When the President enters into negotiations over a trade
agreement that will affect non-tariff barriers, the President could consult
the governors of the states. The President need not consult each governor
individually, just as under Fast-Track the President need only consult the
members of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee.'39 In a similar fashion, the governors of the fifty states could
organize themselves in a committee to deal with trade issues affecting
states' interests. Such a requirement would ensure a voice for the states in
the process of negotiating trade agreement that could affect states'
interests. 40
The participation of the governors should be limited to those areas
where states have a legitimate interest. Those are non-tariff barriers.
Specifically, the governors should only offer their opinions on those non-
tariff barriers that would change state regulations. These would be in
health, safety, environmental, and labor issues. The governors should not
be able to affect those parts of the trade negotiations dealing with issues
fully within federal jurisdiction, such as tariff levels, the elimination of
quotas, and rules of origin. Such constraints would ensure that the
governors only participate in areas of legitimate state concern, and not
unduly hinder the negotiation process.
Congressional consultations are reinforced by the fact that Congress
must still approve of the trade agreement before it can become law. Thus,
Congress has the security of voting on the trade agreement. The governors
do not have such insurance. This can be remedied by requiring any
provision of a trade agreement that involves changes in existing health,
safety, environmental and labor regulations to receive approval from a
majority of the committee of governors. Without such approval, any such
provision cannot become law.
To set up such a mechanism within Fast-Track need not create an
inefficient hindrance to the President. First, as Chief Justice Burger
138. 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992).
139. H.R. 2621, supra note 46, § 104(a)(1)(B).
140. This proposal would be consistent with current United States policy as 19 U.S.C. §
2114c(2)(A)(i)(1998) provides an informal method whereby the President consults with state
governments where "he deems appropriate," during the course of trade negotiations.
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asserted, efficiency is not a primary goal of a democracy.' Indeed, if
efficiency translated into the accumulation of power in the hands of the
President at the expense of the states, this could lead to a tyrannical
government. The President would be able to rule without taking into
concern the interests of the state governments.
Second, efficiency would actually be promoted by adding a
prophylactic mechanism to protect state sovereignty 42  before the
conclusion of the trade agreement. Currently, states would be forced to
wait until after the agreement is concluded to challenge the agreement. 1
43
Otherwise, without a final agreement, there would be no tangible injury
141. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1982).
142. See supra, notes 51-56 and accompanying text for an argument that federalism is an
independent value from the rights and interests of the people who live within the states that is
worthy of protection. See also, supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text for a summary of
Justice O'Connor's defense of federalism.
143. In Public Citizens v. United States Trade Representative, 970 F.2d 916, 917
(D.C.Cir. 1992), the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit faced a challenge to NAFTA
negotiations. The plaintiffs sought an order for the Trade Representative to prepare an
environmental statement for NAFTA during the negotiation process. The court found that for
there to be a cause of action, there needed to be a final act of an administrative agency. Id. at
919. In this case, as the negotiations were still in progress, there was no guarantee that the
negotiations would produce a final agreement. Without a final agreement, there can be no final
act of an administrative agency. Id.
After NAFrA had been concluded, but before it had passed Congress, the plaintiffs
renewed their suit. The Court of Appeals reasoned that since the President had the authority to
renegotiate NAFTA, or decide not to submit it to Congress, it was not the Trade Representative's
action that the plaintiffs were challenging. Public Citizens v. United States Trade Representative,
5 F.3d 549, 553 (D.C.Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 685 (1994). As presidential actions
were not final administrative agency acts, they were not reviewable under the APA. Id. The court
concluded by stating that "NAFTA's fate now rests in the hands of the political branches. The
judiciary has no role to play." Id. This statement is a power indication of the deference the courts
gave to the Executive branch. It implied that the courts would not interfere in the process of
implementing the trade agreement, even if it involved the accelerated process involved in Fast
Track.
One more attempt to compel the issuance of an environmental impact statement came
to the District Court in Public Citizens v. Kantor, 864 F.Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1994). In this case,
the Uruguay Round of GATT had to be completed, and an agreement sent to Congress under Fast-
Track procedures. Id. at 211. This time, the court asserted that the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the second action brought by the plaintiffs "unequivocally foreclosed judicial review."
Id. The court could not revisit the issue on a writ of mandamus. Id. at 213.
These cases demonstrate a reluctance on the part of the courts to review the process
of negotiation of trade agreements. Instead of deciding the case on the merits of the cause of
action, the courts dismissed the cases under a doctrine of deference. The courts decided to
dismiss the cases finding either the controversy to lack the requisite ripeness, or the plaintiff to
lack standing. This suggests a tendency of the courts to avoid the issue of the constitutionality of
the President's authority under Fast-Track.
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that the states could contest.'" The states would be forced to challenge
trade agreements only after becoming law. At that point, there would be
greater pressure on the courts to uphold the validity of the agreement.
The better alternative would be to address the issue of state
sovereignty before the agreement is concluded. The removal of non-tariff
barriers that affect state regulations could then be addressed during the
negotiation process, and receive an approval before the agreement becomes
final. Then, an agreement such as NAFTA could not be said to dictate to
the states how to regulate without including the states in the process. This
would have the function of protecting not only the value of creating greater
certainty with regard to trade agreements that affect the states, but also of
upholding federalism.
IV. CONCLUSION
The history of presidential trade authority has shown a tendency of
Congress to delegate power to the President to decrease influence of
special interests. Beginning in 1934, Congress sought to avoid the
influence of protectionist forces. The effect of Fast-Track today is to blunt
the influence of labor and environmental interests. It is for this reason that
labor and environmental interests have aimed to defeat Fast-Track.
However, in centralizing authority over international trade
agreements, Congress may be acting to circumvent safeguards deliberately
placed in the constitutional structure. Specifically, federalism acts to ensure
excessive power does not become accumulated in one set of hands. The
aim is to avoid tyranny.
No safeguards exist in Fast-Track for federalism. As trade
agreements address non-tariff barriers, the Federal Government must
recognize that trade agreements affect states' interests. By the very terms
of NAFTA, the Federal Government is bound to seek state compliance.
Yet, the states have no role in the formation of the trade agreements.
Instead, they are forced to accept the agreement and any changes in state
laws, without a voice in its creation. This problem can be solved easily by
requiring the President to consult representatives of state governments
during the negotiations, just as the President consults members of
Congress. Such a requirement would not act as a hurdle to the formation
of a trade agreement, and encourages greater efficiency by avoiding attacks
on the agreement after it has been concluded. Requiring consultations with
representatives of state governments during trade negotiations would ensure
continued vitality of federalism.
144. Public Citizens, 970 F.2d at 919.
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